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Egmont and Memory 
Steffan Davies 
Egmont is an attractive drama, but perennially difficult to interpret. Its students, from seminar 
discussions to scholarly volumes, find it hard to square Egmont’s sound political principles 
with his apparent political naivety; the drama’s structure seems elusive even though its plot 
is easy to follow. Critics must account, as Jim Reed puts it concisely in The Classical Centre, for 
‘the poetic strength of the play but also its weakness as drama and the weakness of its hero’.1 
Goethe himself was uneasy with a drama that had been twelve years in the making (1775–
1787: see FA, I, 5, pp. 1234–39), entrusting its revision for performance on the Weimar stage 
to Schiller in 1796. Part of the problem is that the drama does not really fit the binaries that 
at first glance look like promising approaches: freedom versus tyranny, candour versus 
cunning, naivety versus insight, public versus private. Tracing a different thread – memory – 
in Egmont not only argues for the relevance in the eighteenth century of a topic that is often 
associated, first and foremost, with the traumas of the twentieth; it also offers a way to 
reconsider some of the seemingly intractable problems in the play.  
 The past is present in the opening speech of Egmont. ‘Drei Ringe schwarz, die habt ihr 
eure Tage nicht geschossen’ (I. Armbrustschießen; FA, I, 5, p. 461): Jetter has never in his life 
managed the shot he would need to win now, and so Soest reasonably expects to win. But of 
course it is not to be: Buyck, the outsider and soldier under Egmont, intervenes and upsets 
the established order. He takes Jetter’s turn, wins the tournament, and insists, against 
tradition, of buying his competitors not a half but a full round of drinks. He may have been 
                                                          
1 T. J. Reed, The Classical Centre: Goethe and Weimar 1775–1832 (London: Croom Helm, 
1980), p. 51.  
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crowned the winner of their game, but that does not bind him to their rules: ‘Ich bin fremd 
und König und achte eure Gesetze und Herkommen nicht’ (p. 462). As the scene continues, 
the past returns again, first in the memories of the battles of St Quentin and Gravelines. Those 
memories are immediate and partial: Ruysum recalls St Quentin as the battle that made him 
an invalid, but Buyck’s lively, swashbuckling memory of Gravelines drowns him out: ‘Freunde! 
da gings frisch! den Sieg haben wir allein.’ (p. 463) Ruysum and Buyck’s chorus ‘Es lebe der 
Krieg!’ (p. 466) triggers a third set of references to the past: Jetter’s memory of the Spanish 
occupation of Brussels, which we later learn still gives him nightmares. Do you realise what 
you’re wishing for? asks Jetter – remember the sigh of relief we all heaved when the Spaniards 
left.  
 These opening dialogues suggest two connected but distinct approaches to the past. 
One sees a past that can be categorised and rationally apprehended, and that creates 
reasonable expectations of the future: Jetter’s biography, a successful tailor perhaps, but a 
poor shot. The other past is one that does not work by logical reconstruction, but rather 
through affect, emotion, immediacy and relation to the present. Its objects are the recent, 
the directly experienced and the seen: those lived battles and the Spanish occupation, retold 
according to their retrospective importance for the here and now. This is a personal, 
subjective, even intimate past, vividly remembered. The first might be called history, and the 
second memory, and they mark a tension among the drama’s characters both as attitudes to 
the past and as ways of knowing.  
 Writers on cultural memory consistently distinguish history and memory, even though 
they are also interconnected, and even though in broad terms the same things can be said of 
both. Claims that the past is called upon to shape the present, or that the past is reconstructed 
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from the present’s point of view, apply equally to the two. What are the differences? Pierre 
Nora, introducing the French lieux de mémoire project, suggested that ‘memory is life’ and ‘a 
perpetually actual phenomenon’; history, on the other hand, rests on rupture: it is ‘the 
reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer’, it ‘calls for analysis 
and criticism’. For Nora, ‘memory takes root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images and 
objects’; history works by abstraction. 2  Aleida Assmann is more conciliatory: she aligns 
memory in Nora’s sense with ‘Funktionsgedächtnis’ and history with memory as storage, 
‘Speichergedächtnis’, and in doing this she consciously draws on Nietzsche’s distinction 
between ‘archival history’ and the apprehension of the past that is useful for ‘life’.3 Memory 
and history are opposites for Assmann, but they also depend on each other, not least as 
mutual correctives. The hallmarks of functional memory are ‘Gruppenbezug, Selektivität, 
Wertbindung und Zukunftsorientierung’,4 but history is the reserve on which it draws.  
 Goethe’s own writings on history make little systematic use of the terms ‘Gedächtnis’ 
or ‘Erinnerung’, but they pre-empt this thinking in two ways. First, they keenly and 
consistently ask what the individual’s place is in history: how individuals and individual, lived 
experience relate to the historical process, be that in forming that process or in conflicting 
with it. The famous verdict on Shakespeare in 1771, ‘seine Stücke drehen sich alle um den 
geheimen Punkt […] in dem das Eigentümliche unseres Ichs, die prätendierte Freiheit unsres 
Wollens mit dem notwendigen Gang des Ganzen zusammenstoßt’ (FA I, 18, p. 11), established 
                                                          
2 Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, trans. by Marc 
Roudebush, Representations, 132 (1989), 7–24 (pp. 8–9).  
3 Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume. Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen 
Gedächtnisses (Munich: Beck, 1999), pp. 130–142; see Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Unzeitgemässe 
Betrachtungen. Zweites Stück: Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben’ [1874], 
in Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), I, 243–334.  
4 Assmann, p. 134.  
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a lifelong theme. Memory’s function in constituting individual identity was an early modern 
innovation, notably, though not uncontroversially, in the philosophy of John Locke;5 Gabriel 
Motzkin, in a study focused on Die Wahlverwandtschaften, sees memory as basic to the 
relationship between self and other in Goethe’s thought.6 Second and connected to this, 
Goethe persistently looked for ways to capture experience beyond what is available to the 
historian. Some of the maxims in his Theory of Colour convey this in brief. He seems close to 
Nora when he writes: 
Es gibt zweierlei Erfahrungsarten, die Erfahrung des Abwesenden und die des 
Gegenwärtigen. Die Erfahrung des Abwesenden, wozu das Vergangene gehört, 
machen wir auf fremde Autorität, die des Gegenwärtigen sollten wir auf eigene 
Autorität machen. Beides gehörig zu tun, ist die Natur des Individuums durchaus 
unzulänglich. (FA, I, 23/1, p. 614)  
Jim Reed has connected these ideas back to Egmont. On the face of it, he points out, Schiller’s 
Don Karlos is driven by high, perhaps distant, ideals; Egmont draws on the same past but ‘out 
of a commitment to concrete local realities’. Don Karlos seems to be about more abstract 
ideas, about ‘history’; Egmont is an early and down-to-earth expression of Historismus. He 
goes on to argue that the two visions are nonetheless ‘wholly compatible’ in a common cause: 
‘The historicist vision is not so much a rival of the Enlightenment as its convincing 
embodiment in time and place.’ ‘[P]rinciple remains pale, reality is potentially chaotic,’ he 
                                                          
5 Assmann, pp. 95–100. On Goethe and Locke: Stefan Keppler, Grenzen des Ich: Die 
Verfassung des Subjekts in Goethes Romanen und Erzählungen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), 
pp. 112–17.  
6 Gabriel Motzkin, ‘Goethe’s Theory of Memory’, in Goethe und das Zeitalter der Romantik, 
ed. by Walter Hinderer (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), pp. 151–62.  
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writes; bridging the dichotomy between them was one of the Enlightenment’s ‘central 
problem[s] and task[s]’.7  
 For a historical drama, there is very little ‘sense of history’ in Egmont, insofar as the 
drama’s characters very rarely think about the historical past and less still about its specifics. 
Given that, the ‘historians’ among the characters stand out all the more. Vansen is the most 
prominent, the clerk and rabble-rouser who enters the action in Act Two and tells the citizens 
about their historic rights. He has certainly done his research: ‘Ich hatte einen alten Patron, 
der besaß Pergamente und Briefe, von uralten Stiftungen, Kontrakten und Gerechtigkeiten, 
er hielt auf die rarsten Bücher. In einem stund unsre ganze Verfassung […].’ (II. Platz in Brüssel; 
FA, I, 5, p. 483) Vansen’s key medium is the written word – the book – and it is his claims 
about what he has read that turn the citizens’ cry from ‘Ordnung und Freiheit!’ to ‘Freiheit 
und Privilegien’. Brackenburg remembers his book learning at school, and how ‘Brutus Rede 
für die Freiheit’ once fired him up (I. Bürgerhaus; p. 479), but this is a memory relegated to 
Assmann’s ‘store’, serving only to contrast with his impotence in the present.8 Klärchen, by 
                                                          
7 T. J. Reed, Light in Germany: Scenes from an Unknown Enlightenment (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2015), pp. 70–71. Friedrich Meinecke’s chapter on Goethe as a forerunner 
of Historismus (1936) saw in Egmont, like Götz von Berlichingen, an expression of ‘der 
verborgene Springquell der echten Individualität, der “innere Kern ihrer Eigenheit”’: 
Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, ed. by Carl Hinrichs, 4th edn (Munich, 
Oldenbourg, 1965), p. 461; cf. Egmont, IV. Der Culenburgische Palast; FA, I, 5, p. 528.  
8 Brackenburg is probably referring to (Marcus Iunius) Brutus, the murderer of Caesar: see 
Mathew Bell, ‘“This was a man!” Goethe’s Egmont and Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar’, MLR, 
111 (2016), 141–61 (pp. 146–47). In Julius Caesar, III. 1. 103–10, Brutus tells his fellow 
assassins to wash their hands in Caesar’s blood, ‘And waving our red weapons o’er our 
heads | Let’s all cry, “Peace, Freedom and Liberty.”’ Cassius sees this as an act for posterity: 
‘Stoop, then, and wash. How many ages hence | Shall this our lofty scene be acted over | In 
states unborn and accents yet unknown?’ (lines 111–13). The speech is out of character for 
Shakespeare’s Brutus, but it well fits Brackenburg’s memory of his adolescence: ‘damals 
kocht es und trieb!’ Lucius Iunus Brutus, the – possibly unhistorical – founder of the Roman 
Republic in 509 BCE, might be another candidate, but a less likely one. His supposed oath 
and speech in defence of Rome’s freedom after deposing the king, Tarquinius Superbus, are 
reported by Livy (1. 59) and at length by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Antiquitates Romanae, 
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contrast with him, is not a historian who laments a better past: rather, driven by that live 
memory of Egmont when he is not around, by the power of seeing him and of imagining his 
presence, she shows history at the service of memory, the past accessed to inform immediacy. 
Klärchen nearly lets out the secret of her affair when she sees a woodcut diagram of the battle 
of Gravelines hanging at her cousin’s house, showing Egmont, as in Buyck’s description, with 
his horse shot dead underneath him, and she sends Brackenburg to exchange the book she 
has been reading for ‘wieder so eine Historie’ (I. Bürgerhaus; pp. 478–79). 
 The other historian, and the most revealing and puzzling, is Machiavell; indeed 
Machiavell and Margarete von Parma are the two characters apart from Egmont – with whom 
they never appear on stage – who do the most to complicate black-and-white interpretations 
of the play. In his first scene with the Regent, in Act I, Machiavell has written up a blunt report 
on the ‘iconoclastic fury’ to send to King Philip; it is ‘ausführlich und umständlich wie es der 
König liebt’ (I. Palast der Regentin; p. 469). Margarete will sign the report, but her attitude to 
the events is different. She is haunted by them, and the thought of them gives her no peace. 
Machiavell reading his report only pricks and pains her imagination again. Machiavell has a 
concrete, reasonable proposal to improve matters: tolerate the new faith, and the rebels will 
have nothing to rebel about.9 But Margarete has seldom taken his advice in the past, he says, 
and: ‘Ihr sagtet oft im Scherze, du siehst zu weit Machiavell, du solltest Geschichtschreiber 
sein, wer handelt muß fürs nächste sorgen. Und doch habe ich diese Geschichte nicht voraus 
erzählt? hab ich nicht alles vorausgesehen.’ (p. 469) Historians, then, see into the future; the 
                                                          
4. 50–84), but neither of those texts could so memorably have fired up the young 
Brackenburg.  
9 On Machiavell and his ‘entirely practical’ stance, see Ritchie Robertson, ‘Goethe and 
Machiavelli’, in The Present Word: Culture, Society and the Site of Literature. Essays in 
Honour of Nicholas Boyle, ed. by John Walker (Oxford: Legenda, 2013), pp. 126–37 (pp. 128–
30).  
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immediacy with which Margarete apprehends the past translates into an immediate grasp of 
the present. Haunted by events, Margarete points out the immediate reasons why 
Machiavell’s good plan will not work. She knows well enough that pragmatism over principle 
is part of politics, but Machiavell’s proposal is worldly (there is no right to apply it to matters 
spiritual) and in any case, Philip will never allow it. Here is a clear reminder that immediacy 
correlates with emotion but not with fantasy: haunted Margarete is being more realistic here 
than pragmatic Machiavell. Both are right, Machiavell in his fear, later borne out by events, 
that repression will cause revolt, and Margarete in seeing that what he advises is no solution. 
In their second dialogue, in Act Three, it is Margarete, not Machiavell, who is capable of 
reading between the lines of Philip’s reply. When Margarete imagines the scheming at the 
Spanish court that the letter does not convey, Machiavell is sceptical – ‘Ihr habt zu dem 
Gemälde einen guten Farbtopf gewählt’ – but it is she who will be proved right (III. Palast der 
Regentin; p. 503).  
 Egmont similarly works with that immediacy that distinguishes memory from history. 
On his first appearance he is dismissive of the clamour for ‘rights and privileges’, but he 
remembers Jetter just as he remembers anyone he has met before. He sees his position as 
guaranteed by symbolic objects, notably the insignia of the Golden Fleece, rather than by 
historical status. Memory deals equally in lived experience and in notions from a distant but 
not a historically dated past, and indeed, it might be said that Egmont plays fast and loose 
with history. The title he uses, ‘Graf Egmont’, evokes his ancestral claim to the county of 
Geldern, lost to Burgundy and thence to Spain (I. Palast der Regentin; p. 472), but when it 
suits him the wrongs of the past can also be forgotten over time. Alba reminds him, not 
unfairly, that the right of Dutch citizens to be ruled by their ‘brothers’ in reality means the 
right of the aristocracy to rule over them; ‘Das ist vor Jahrhunderten geschehen’, Egmont 
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replies, ‘und wird jetzt ohne Neid geduldet’ (IV. Der Culenburgische Palast; p. 527). Philip II of 
Spain is king by historical accident, ‘durch gut Glück’, as Vansen tells the citizens (II. Platz in 
Brüssel; p. 483); by contrast Buyck has told the same crowd in the opening scene that Egmont, 
as an archer at least, does not depend on luck or mood; he is just a natural (‘nein wie er anlegt 
immer schwarz geschossen’, p. 462).  
Egmont’s perceived immediacy is what gives his character the charismatic authority 
that Frank Lamport has identified with Egmont, Götz von Berlichingen, Wallenstein and 
others.10 Charismatic rule, as defined by Max Weber, rests on ‘die außeralltägliche Hingabe 
an die Heiligkeit oder die Heldenkraft oder die Vorbildlichkeit einer Person und der durch sie 
offenbarten oder geschaffenen Ordnungen’.11 Such devotion is evident when the burghers 
first mention Egmont: ‘warum trügen wir ihn alle auf den Händen? Weil man ihm ansieht daß 
er uns wohlwill, weil ihm die Fröhlichkeit, das freie Leben die gute Meinung aus den Augen 
sieht’ (I. Armbrustschießen; p. 463). It thus cuts through rational ties, whereas ‘traditional’ 
rule and ‘legal’ authority (i.e. that of the modern, bureaucratic state) depend on them. It rests 
on emotion – Weber elsewhere rephrased his definition to emphasise ‘affektuelle Hingabe an 
die Person des Herrn’ – and on the perception of ‘eine als außeralläglich [...] geltende Qualität 
einer Persönlichkeit’.12 It is carried by the popular support that it commands and it collapses 
– as does Egmont’s appeal in Act Five – once that support is lost. Egmont with his secretary 
Richard thus ‘hates writing’ and has little time for the bureaucracy on his desk, and he asks 
Richard to forge his handwriting in reply to a letter from Count Oliva warning him that danger 
                                                          
10 F. J. Lamport, ‘The Charismatic Hero: Goethe, Schiller, and the Tragedy of Character’, 
PEGS, 58 (1988), 62–83.  
11 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 3rd edn, 2 vols (Tübingen: Mohr, 1947), I, 124. 
12 Max Weber, ‘Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft’, in Weber, Gesammelte 
Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, ed. by Johannes Winckelmann, 7th edn (Tübingen: Mohr, 
1988), pp. 475–88 (p. 481); Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, I, 140 (my emphases).  
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is at hand (II. Egmonts Wohnung). That letter from Oliva is significant, because in it Oliva 
appeals to Egmont’s involvement in the the ‘beggars’ movement’: after noble petitioners to 
Margaret of Parma were dismissed in 1566 as ‘beggars’ (gueux), they took this as a badge of 
honour and the name and symbol of their revolt. Oliva seems to be warning Egmont 
specifically that what may have started harmlessly and spontaneously now looks more and 
more, and dangerously, like open rebellion, but Egmont is in no mood to take this distant, 
written warning seriously: ‘Schenke mir diese Betrachtungen, wir wollen sie Schülern und 
Höflingen überlassen, sie mögen sinnen und aussinnen, wandeln und schleichen, gelangen 
wohin sie können, erschleichen was sie können.’ (p. 493) And however you reply, Richard, 
says Egmont, please don’t make it read like a book.  
 Out of those two approaches to the past, it is memory that works with the imagination 
(rather than powers of recall), that works by emotion, through impressions and appearance. 
Nora describes memory as ‘affective and magical’, as being ‘responsive to all methods of 
transfer’.13 Memory is about telling stories, but those stories are not fixed; memory can be 
decisive in how we act without being fully coherent. Social psychologist Jürgen Straub writes 
that memory is ‘constructed and re-constructed in the process of recollecting, at times 
spontaneously and seemingly unsystematically and at other times in a deliberate and focused 
manner.’14 In Egmont, the other decisive expression of this same tension is sight. This is no 
coincidence: thinkers from Aristotle onwards have seen visual perception as part of how we 
                                                          
13 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p. 8, quoted with modification; cf. Pierre Nora, 
‘Entre Mémoire et Histoire: La problématique des lieux’, in Les lieux de mémoire, ed. by 
Pierre Nora, 7 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1984–92), I (1984), xv–xlii (p. xix). 
14 Jürgen Straub, ‘Psychology, Narrative, and Cultural Memory: Past and Present’, in A 
Companion to Cultural Memory Studies, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2010), pp. 215–28 (p. 218).  
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remember and how we articulate our memories.15 ‘Imagist’ accounts of memory may struggle 
to distinguish adequately between memory and imagination in the mechanics of individual 
recollection – ‘How’, asks Mary Warnock, ‘do we know that an image does not relate to the 
future, rather than the past?’ 16  – but in their broader, cultural application, the blurred 
distinction is productive: it is memory more than history that also allows people to imagine 
what could be in the future. That first comment on Egmont places visual imagination at the 
base of the burghers’ allegiance to him: ‘Weil man ihm ansieht daß er uns wohlwill, weil ihm 
die Fröhlichkeit, das freie Leben die gute Meinung aus den Augen sieht’ (my emphasis). If this 
is a drama about ‘different ways of seeing’, as Elizabeth Wilkinson called it,17 then the phrase 
can take us on to John Berger’s television series and his influential book of the same title, 
published in 1972, which begins: 
 Seeing comes before words. The child looks and recognizes before it can speak.  
But there is also another sense in which seeing comes before words. It is seeing which 
establishes our place in the surrounding world; we explain that world with words, but 
words can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it. The relation between 
what we see and what we know is never settled.18 
Seeing, then, also fits the unpredictability and the resistance to fixity that has also been 
associated with memory in the decades since Berger’s book.  
                                                          
15 Anne Whitehead, Memory, The New Critical Idiom (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 11; see 
further David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, Interpretation, 
and Reception in Western Scholasticism (Leiden: Brill, 2007).   
16 Mary Warnock, Memory (London: Faber, 1987), p. 16. 
17 Elizabeth M. Wilkinson, ‘The Relation of Form and Meaning in Goethe’s Egmont’, in 
Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, Goethe: Poet and Thinker (London: Arnold, 
1962), pp. 55–74 (p. 63); see also Reed, The Classical Centre, p. 52.  
18 John Berger, Ways of Seeing (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 7. 
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 Egmont is imagined before he is seen; indeed Schiller in his review (1788), complaining 
that the drama was not historical enough, deemed his image as a great man to be a matter 
of hearsay (NA, 22, p. 202). Once he is on stage, Egmont’s concern with immediacy comes 
across in his constant awareness of appearance; he has grasped the power of ‘memory politics’ 
and political imagery from the outset. What is perplexing about his dismissal of Oliva’s letter 
is that he clearly does remember the episode and how he dressed his servants in new liveries 
to perpetuate the joke about the nobles being ‘beggars’: this is why he remembers Jetter, 
who made the new uniforms, and Margarete remembers the episode too (I. Palast der 
Regentin; p. 473). Egmont knows the political significance of appearance: this is precisely the 
basis of both his objection to Oranien – that if they leave the Netherlands they will look like 
rebels and that will make them rebels – and his appeal to Alba, which centres on how best to 
gain the trust of the people. The dialogue with Alba centres on affect: on fears and rumours, 
and on popular perceptions of legitimate rule. Egmont knows that if he wants to keep his 
prized independence, he has to be all things to all people: the warrior and the peacemaker, 
the aristocrat and the citizen’s friend, the Dutchman and the loyal servant of Spain. When 
Machiavell the historian judges that ‘[Egmont] scheint mir in allem nach seinem Gewissen zu 
handeln’, Margarete, who watches more closely, replies that ‘Sein Gewissen hat einen 
gefälligen Spiegel’ (I. Palast der Regentin; p. 473). His appearance to Klärchen in Spanish dress 
(III. Clärchens Wohnung) is meant to impress her, and perhaps to reassure her that he will be 
safe under the occupation, but it also gives the lie, visually, to the earlier claim among the 
citizens that he is ‘der echte Niederländer, gar so nichts spanisches’ (II. Platz in Brüssel; p. 487); 
indeed in that same dialogue, Jetter the tailor has already spotted that his coat has a modern, 
Spanish cut. Egmont himself tells Klärchen how politics means dissimulation, and when he 
then tells her ‘Das ist dein Egmont’ (III. Clärchens Wohnung; p. 509), there is no real reason 
12 
 
for the audience to see this as the ‘real’ Egmont in private versus false ones in public. Rather, 
that Egmont is another one of the many.   
 Memory as a key to the politics of this play cuts through the simple distinction 
between good politics and bad. Egmont invites binary interpretation, but as Wilkinson 
pointed out, that binary interpretation ultimately falls short.19 In structural terms, too, the 
drama’s cyclical nature prevents any single character from appearing as Egmont’s full 
antagonist, as he only has one scene with each.20 This is a drama about freedom’s stand 
against despotism, and it contributed to making the Dutch Revolt a ‘respectable vehicle’ in 
Goethe’s own time, in Jonathan Israel’s words, for ‘portraying, considering, and perhaps even 
exalting popular insurrection against tyranny’.21 The Dutch Revolt can thus be seen as part of 
eighteenth-century collective memory, and Goethe’s drama cemented Egmont’s place in 
Flemish, and notably Belgian, identity in the nineteenth century and beyond.22 Yet on the 
other hand, Egmont can be seen as attractive but fatally naïve, a ‘questionable politician’ who 
is perhaps not up to the job of ‘talking to tyrants’.23  
 Much is untidy here because methods and morals do not divide cleanly along the same 
lines. If Egmont’s good politics rely on imagination, then so too does the stock-in-trade of 
Alba’s tyranny, which is fear. Appearance is decisive on both sides of the coin: Margarete 
                                                          
19 Wilkinson, esp. pp. 66–69.  
20 Georg-Michael Schulz, ‘Egmont’, in Goethe Handbuch. II: Dramen, ed. by Theo Buck 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1997), pp. 154–72 (p. 156).  
21 Jonathan I. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 
1750–1790 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 746.  
22 Rengenier C. Rittersma, Egmont da capo – eine mythogenetische Studie (Münster: 
Waxmann, 2009), pp. 274–78.  
23 Martin W. Swales, ‘A Questionable Politician: A Discussion of the Ending to Goethe’s 
“Egmont”’, MLR, 66 (1971), 832–40; T. J. Reed, ‘Talking to Tyrants: Dialogues with Power in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany’, The Historical Journal, 33 (1990), 63–79.  
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knows that her good work will pale at a distance (‘[es] sieht gewiß in der Ferne wie nichts aus, 
eben weils gut ist’: III. Palast der Regentin; p. 503) while the burghers know that repressive 
regimes trump up the most innocent mistake – humming the Calvinist Psalms – into serious 
crimes: if something looks like rebellion then it is rebellion. Egmont may claim that there is a 
‘public’ and a ‘private’ Egmont but in fact he breaks down that very divide; Alba’s regime is 
cynically in pursuit of the same thing, wanting sight, ‘Offenbarung’, of what goes on in private 
by getting family members to spy on each other (IV. Straße; p. 510). What about naivety? In 
Margarete’s case, her emotional apprehension of the riots makes her more realistic than 
Machiavell. Whilst Egmont’s politics are indeed those of emotion and appearance, those, too, 
should not be dismissed out of hand as flimsy or detached. Egmont is the enemy of calculation 
– this is the ‘Spanish way’ (II. Egmonts Wohnung; p. 491) and it is a bone of contention 
between him and Oranien – but surely he and Oranien are in fact as calculating as each other, 
just in unlike terms. Egmont calculates that leaving the Netherlands will trigger rebellion 
because of how it will look, just as Oranien calculates that staying will mean certain death. 
And at that point, Oranien’s calculation does not rest on greater factual knowledge. The 
game-changing moment in their dialogue is much-quoted: ‘Alba ist unterwegs. Egmont: Ich 
glaubs nicht. Oranien: Ich weiß es’ – but we need to read on: ‘Egmont: Die Regentin wollte 
nichts wissen. Oranien: Um so mehr bin ich überzeugt’ (II. Egmonts Wohnung; p. 497, my 
emphasis). Oranien is not informed, but convinced. Like Machiavell and Margarete in their 
first dialogue, both men are right. Egmont reads the logic of tyranny just as accurately as 
Oranien: disobedience means rebellion, rebellion will mean misery. He fully understands the 
gravity of the new regime. It was all very well to dress the servants like beggars under 
Margaret of Parma, but that kind of stunt has no place now; perhaps he has paid more 
attention to Oliva’s letter than he admits. Reading Egmont in 2017 is salutary, because 
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although the big issues are crystal clear, the way politics is conducted is only in part principled, 
or rational, or predictable, and there is no suggestion of a single or simple or best way out of 
the mess.  
 What tracing memory in this drama does let us do is to place Egmont emphatically as 
a representative of a new, forward-looking politics, even if he is also its victim. He is as much 
a ‘new politician’ as Oranien and Alba, not a remnant of the old; charisma is the antithesis of 
tradition. Egmont is not a latter-day Götz von Berlichingen, of whom Goethe claimed in 1771, 
‘Ich […] rette das Andencken eines braven Mannes’ (FA, I, 28, p. 247). The trajectories into 
which they fit are quite different: Götz really is the last of a dying breed, who will be forgotten 
by those who follow him, albeit at their peril; the Dutch Revolt had quite some measure of 
success. Egmont appeals very little to historical rights, and he is contemptuous of the call for 
them, as is Alba. He goes to Alba because his politics of image and appearance leave him little 
other choice, and because he thinks he can speak a language of pragmatism with him: this is 
what the people fear, this is how to allay it. Here Egmont’s grasp of how things look meets 
Machiavell’s vision of how things might be. Alba defends a new order in Brussels against the 
old, but he says the same things to Egmont that sounded like a defence of tradition when 
Margarete said them to Machiavell: such thinking is all very well, but not where it ‘plays with 
God’ and treats ‘established doctrine’ with indifference; the king is the king, and his authority 
will not be bent.  
 Memory might seem an awkward or at least an arbitrary choice of a term to glue 
together several related concepts – immediacy, emotion, sight versus words, new politics 
versus the old – were it not for the drama’s fifth act. This is where Egmont returns, ultimately, 
to memory, to where he began in Act One – to image, or to Schiller’s ‘hearsay’. If Acts One to 
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Four are about the place of ‘memory politics’ in history, and in the short term, their failure 
against Alba’s power, then Act Five is about the equally political translation of the historical 
Egmont into memory. One thread of consistency between Act Five and the rest of the drama 
is Egmont’s mode of doing politics, which runs up to the final act and continues there. So, too, 
of course, do cold facts, of the kind with which Margarete deflated Machiavell’s grand plans. 
Crucially that central tension remains, between memory and history and between their 
correlatives, the potent reality of emotion and imagination versus that of logically discernible 
– and unavoidable – events.  
 Klärchen moves in Act Five from cultivating personal memory to actively promoting 
Egmont as a political symbol to a crowd that no longer wants to know. When this fails, her 
indignation at a world in which Egmont can be condemned is mixed with the memory of their 
times together and with dreams of setting him free. Egmont in prison is haunted by memory 
(he can’t sleep); whereas Oliva wrote to remind him of a specific historical episode, his mind’s 
eye now takes him in an ‘Erinnrungstraum des Glücks’ (V. Gefängnis; p. 535) to a series of 
decisive but less defined pictures from his past, mixed up with his fear in the present. He has 
a vision of being freed, but remember Margarete to Machiavell: visions take time, and that is 
time that Egmont doesn’t have, because as Brackenburg reports in the next scene, he has 
seen the scaffold being built, with his own eyes. The same tension between emotion and hard 
fact is decisive in the prison scene with Ferdinand, another admirer of Egmont since childhood. 
Egmont says that there are two things that are sending him to his death: one is the written 
judgement that Silva has just read out; the other, and the more significant, is the jealousy on 
which Alba has brooded since their youth: Egmont was the luckier gambler and the better 
shot. There is one last hope that Ferdinand has come to get him out of gaol, that there is a 
pragmatic solution to all this (Alba has got what he needs and can now be merciful; or you 
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can spirit me out of here), but no. Egmont hopes that his death might have a predictable, 
discernible meaning, that like Weber’s ‘charismatic’ prophet he might yet change the 
expected course of history,24 but again, no: ‘Kann mein Blut für viele fließen, meinem Volk 
Friede bringen, so fließt es willig. Leider wirds nicht so werden.’ (V. Gefängnis; p. 548)  
 Schiller’s review of Egmont grappled with the tensions that have puzzled the critics 
since, objecting more than anything to the centrality in the drama of a ‘great man’ who turns 
out not to be great. He implied that finishing the play with Ferdinand’s visit to Egmont, a scene 
that was ‘meisterhaft erfunden und ausgeführt’, would have been better than Goethe’s 
choice of a ‘Salto mortale in eine Opernwelt’, the vision of Klärchen at its very end (NA, 22, 
pp. 207–08). The opera ends on deliberately dissonant notes, however, which Schiller did not 
hear. The final scene does not escape into dreaming; rather, it holds in tension Egmont’s 
brutal and meaningless death on the one hand, and the vision of the Low Countries led to 
freedom on the other. The vision is memory in reverse, both chronologically (it is posterity at 
this point, a vision of what is going to be memory) and because it is a vision of how Egmont’s 
defeat will become part of a collective memory of triumph. This might indeed seem illogical, 
‘ein witziger Einfall’, as Schiller complained (NA, 22, p. 209), and it is a vision set far into the 
future, after Egmont’s hopes of an immediately meaningful death have been dashed. But the 
scene acknowledges this very point as it goes on: day breaks on the vision, and Egmont is led 
off to his death by soldiers driven, so he says, by ‘ein hohles Wort des Herrschers nicht ihr 
Gemüt’ (V. Gefängnis; p. 551). It is entirely appropriate that in that last scene, the vision on 
the one hand clashes against the ranks of Spanish soldiers who fill the stage on the other. 
                                                          
24 ‘“Es steht geschrieben, ich aber sage Euch” gilt für den Propheten’: Weber, ‘Die drei 
reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft’, p. 482; cf. Matthew 4. 4–10 and 5. 21–45.  
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Both, after all, are parts of the Dutch past; both bring together the dynamics that have 
competed with each other since the very start of the play.  
